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Winners are grinners: Expressing authentic positive emotion enhances status in performance contexts[★]

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ABSTRACT

Research has shown that people who express positive emotion following victory risk appearing unlikeable and inconsiderate. We investigated whether these relational costs might be offset by status benefits, and the processes underlying such benefits. Across eight experiments (N=1456), we found that winners who expressed positive emotion were perceived as higher in social standing than winners who suppressed positive emotion. To understand the mechanisms underlying this effect, we manipulated factors to do with the *situation* in which emotion was expressed, the type of *person* expressing emotion, and the *way* emotion was expressed. We also conducted replications of these experiments. The only factor that consistently moderated the expressivity effect was perceived authenticity, such that expressive winners only gained status benefits when observers believed the emotion expression was authentic. The findings point to the power of context in shaping the nature of the social benefits reaped by expressing positive emotion.

1. Introduction

Authenticity

It feels good to win. Triumphing in this way inspires a range of positive feelings from elation and excitement, to pride and pleasure, and even gratitude and geniality. Yet, people do not only *feel* positive emotion when they win; they also tend to express that emotion. While this expression is partly the natural outgrowth of feeling strong emotion (emotion experience and expression are moderately correlated; Gross, John, & Richards, 2000), it also serves a distinct social purpose of signalling one's feelings to others. Thus, the expression of positive emotion in competitive, and other, situations communicates information to others about how a person feels, what they are like, and how they are likely to act.

This socio-functional perspective on emotion posits that emotion expression helps people navigate their social world, serving dual functions of maintaining social relationships (affiliation) and position in a social hierarchy (status; Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). People use emotions as social information, inferring beyond feeling states (e.g., she is angry) to logical psychological and behavioral outcomes of that feeling state (e.g., she intends to take revenge; Van Kleef, 2009). Moreover, when making person perception judgments, people use others' emotion expressions (e.g., she is smiling) to make

dispositional attributions about their character (e.g., she is self-confident; Hareli & Hess, 2010). Thus, when people express positive emotion following a win, it feeds into the impression that others form. Understanding the nature of this impression is the main goal of the present research.

Expressing positive emotion is typically considered an affiliative signal—one designed to project warmth and a desire to cooperate (Harker & Keltner, 2001; Shiota, Campos, Keltner, & Hertenstein, 2004). Yet, expressing positive emotion does not always make one appear friendly and likeable. Indeed, in performance contexts, winners who express positive emotion are perceived as less affiliative and less likeable than winners who remain relatively inexpressive (Kalokerinos, Greenaway, Pedder, & Margetts, 2014). This is partly due to the impression that these winners are acting in a manner that is inconsiderate to the feelings of others around them (Kalokerinos et al., 2014). This suggests that winners may benefit from regulating the expression of positive emotion in performance contexts, to avoid giving an impression of inconsiderateness. Possibly mindful of this impression, winners often spontaneously regulate their emotions to inhibit the expression of positive emotion when in the presence of losers (Friedman & Miller-Herringer, 1991; Schall, Martiny, Goetz, & Hall, 2016). This appears to be a rare situation in which people actually reap social

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benefits from *suppressing* the expression of positive emotion—an emotion regulation strategy most typically shown to damage social relations (Butler et al., 2003; Greenaway & Kalokerinos, 2017).

If expressing positive emotion following a win does not signal social affiliation, we argue that it may instead signal social standing (i.e., perceptions of one's place in a social hierarchy). Such a possibility builds on research that suggests a hydraulic link between judgements of warmth—which signals affiliation—and competence—which signals status (Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). Thus, if winners are not attributed affiliative motives for expressing positive emotion, they may instead be attributed high status. We make this argument based on our reading of two bodies of literature: work on discrete emotions and social perception.

Turning first to the literature on discrete emotions, research has shown that the expression of specific emotions, particularly pride, acts to signal high status. For example, Shariff and Tracy (2009) found that expressions of pride were associated implicitly with perceptions of high social status compared with expressions of shame, embarrassment, anger, disgust, fear, or happiness. Pride is an emotion commonly expressed following victory (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008), but it is not the only positive emotion that winners express. For example, winners commonly spontaneously exhibit facial expressions indicative of happiness and joy (Fernandez-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1995; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006). These emotions are typically thought to signal affiliation rather than status, and thus represent a strong test of the link between positive emotion expression and perceived social standing. In the interests of assessing ecologically valid expressions that represent a range of positive emotions, beyond pride, we sourced dynamic videos featuring spontaneous reactions from winners of field and lab-based competitions. We used these general positive emotion expressions to assess the impression formed of these winners by neutral observers who took no part in the competition.

The social perception literature also provides hints that positive emotion expression can create an impression of high status. People commonly infer information about people's status based on how they present themselves. This is because, absent other information about a person, that person's assessment of themselves provides diagnostic information about what they are like. This is the logic underlying the concept of reverse appraisals, in which a person's emotion expression is taken as indicating something about that person's character, traits, or skills (Hareli & Hess, 2010). For example, research shows that other people's confidence is used by naïve observers to assess that person's abilities (Murphy et al., 2015; Murphy, Barlow, & von Hippel, 2017) and that expressed confidence is associated with higher perceived status (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012). People who feel positive emotion are more confident of their own future success (George, 2000). Thus, to the extent that positive emotion and confidence are linked in observers' minds, seeing someone express positive emotion may create the impression that they feel confident about future success, which in turn might shape observers' perceptions of that person's actual ability.

Considered from another angle, expressing positive emotion in competitive contexts may signal more than the fact that one is happy with their own performance, or feels confident about future success. It may also signal that the win itself was of high value—that it is an important win worth celebrating—which provides observers with a guide for how much status to attribute the winner. That is, if people assume a winner's expressive reaction is diagnostic of how valuable the win is, observers should be more inclined to attribute higher status and ability to expressive than non-expressive winners. Drawing on these suggestive lines of inquiry, we predicted overall that winners who express positive emotion will create an impression of high social standing relative to winners who suppress positive emotion.

Astute readers will note that we have used multiple terms to refer to social standing, including status, confidence, success, and ability. In our early thinking on this project, we conceptualized these as fairly interchangeable indicators of social standing, broadly construed. This is

reinforced somewhat by the definition put forward by Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland (2015), who argue that status comprises three major components. First, it involves respect and admiration, such that others hold an individual in high esteem. Second, it involves voluntary deference, such that others choose to comply with an individual's requests. Third, it involves perceived instrumental value, such that an individual is perceived as capable of achieving personal goals. In the present research, we assessed a constellation of measures that tapped into these different aspects of social standing: respect and admiration (i.e., perceived prestige, perceived authenticity; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Liu & Perrewe, 2006), voluntary deference (i.e., perceived influence; Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972), and instrumental value (i.e., perceived competence, success, and future performance; Anderson et al., 2015).

To these, we added measures suggested by other perspectives on social standing. Specifically, we assessed perceptions of winner dominance, which some scholars consider a pathway to status that is distinct from prestige due to its element of coercion (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013). We also assessed perceptions of winner charisma, which is a factor linked with status and positive emotion expression in theories of leadership (Bono & Ilies, 2006).

We made no concrete predictions about which form of social standing would be attributed to winners who expressed positive emotion. That is, we were interested in an exploratory way to discover which sort of "flavor" of social standing people attributed winners who expressed positive emotion. We thought it plausible that this might take the form of intimidation (i.e., greater perceived dominance) and influence (i.e., greater perceived status and prestige) and aptitude (i.e., greater perceived competence and success). In evaluating these constructs, we take a multivariate approach that assesses general patterns of perceptions across the set of measures to test for a general increase in social standing, broadly construed. We followed this up with inspection of the effects on individual measures where appropriate.

We further sought to uncover specific processes through which positive emotion expression may increase perceived social standing following a win. Here again, we took inspiration from the reverse appraisal perspective on person perception, which theorizes that observers reconstruct the emotional appraisals they believe underpin an emotional reaction. That is, observers use a target's emotional expression to infer how the target sees the situation. They then use these "reverse appraisals" to make judgments of the target (Hareli & Hess, 2010). Research has shown that perceivers spontaneously make reverse appraisals from even limited emotion expression information (e.g. de Melo, Carnevale, Read, & Gratch, 2013).

In our experiments, we aim to understand the appraisals made by perceivers in judging social standing from target emotion expression. To test these mechanisms, we took an experimental approach that manipulated the proposed mediator (or a proximal contextual correlate) in order to identify conditions under which the link between positive emotion and social standing is broken (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). We tested three different process variables that we hypothesized might be key to the kinds of reverse appraisals made by our participants. The studies are presented in the order we conceived of these potential explanations, and the paper thus reflects the way our thinking unfolded over time. We note, of course, that the three candidate processes we tested do not represent an exhaustive list, and there are likely multiple appraisal processes at work.

The first process variable we tested was assessed by manipulating the nature of the *audience* of the positive emotion expression. If perceived inconsiderateness is a core process through which positive emotion expression increases social standing (Kalokerinos et al., 2014), we would expect this link to operate only when winners are described as expressing positive emotion in the presence of losers, not when they are described as expressing positive emotion in front of uninvolved observers. We tested this possibility by manipulating winner audience in Experiment 3.

The second process variable we tested was assessed by manipulating the perceived *ability* of the winner expressing emotion. If perceived instrumental value is a core process through which positive emotion increases social standing (Anderson et al., 2015), we would expect this link to operate only when winners could be reasonably expected to continue winning, not when their win was a "fluke". Of course, expressing positive emotion about a win may be construed as one being pleasantly surprised by their performance, in which case explicitly stating the winner's competence would be expected to strengthen the association between expressivity and perceived social standing. We tested these possibilities by manipulating winner ability in Experiment 4.

The final process variable we tested was assessed by manipulating the perceived *authenticity* of the winner's emotional expression. If respect and admiration is a core process through which positive emotion increases social standing (Anderson et al., 2015), we would expect this link to operate only when winners are seen as worthy of trust and regard, not when they are seen as false. In this research, we operationalized this in terms of perceived authenticity and manipulated this factor in Experiment 5. Authentic people are liked, respected, and trusted (Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Liu & Perrewe, 2006); indicators of prestige that are associated with greater perceived status (Anderson et al., 2015). On the other hand, a person who acts inauthentically—for example expressing positive emotion that they do not feel—has opaque motives for doing so that make it difficult to trust that person (Wang & Hsieh, 2013).

1.1. The present research

To investigate the main effect of positive emotion expression on perceived social standing, and mechanisms of this effect, we assessed interpersonal perceptions of winners who express positive emotion in performance contexts. We asked neutral third-party participants to watch videos of winners expressing or suppressing positive emotion, and had them rate the winners in terms of perceived social standing on a range of status-related variables (see Appendix A for list of measures).

We expected that winners who express positive emotion would be perceived as higher in social standing than winners who suppress positive emotion. To test this main effect, we conducted two experiments using different stimulus sets manipulating winner expressivity. Second, to better understand the processes underlying these perceptions, we manipulated three key contextual factors to do with the *situation* in which positive emotion is expressed, the type of *person* expressing positive emotion, and the *way* positive emotion is expressed (Greenaway & Kalokerinos, 2017). As outlined above, these experiments manipulated the *audience* of the expressed emotion (Experiment 3), the *ability* of the winner expressing emotion (Experiment 4), and the *authenticity* of emotion expression (Experiment 5).

We conducted replications of all three of the moderation experiments to provide confirmatory evidence. We report all manipulations and measures included across all experiments, and made no exclusions. The experiments are reported in the order they were conceived, and all data and code are available on the OSF (osf.io/pe5d7). Finally, we conducted a meta-analysis on the results to test the robustness of the effects across all experiments and replications.

2. Experiment 1: ecologically valid winner stimuli

Experiment 1 provided an initial test of the hypothesis that winners who express positive emotion will be perceived as higher in social standing than winners who suppress positive emotion. We used materials from Kalokerinos et al. (2014), who sourced naturalistic videos of winners in three domains: The Academy Awards, tennis matches, and game shows. The videos featured winners who expressed a high or low degree of positive emotion following victory.

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants and design

One hundred community members from Amazon's Mechanical Turk completed the experiment (55% women, $M_{\rm age}=36.93$, $SD_{\rm age}=11.43$, age range 18–66). The experiment employed a within-subjects design in which participants viewed videos of expressive and inexpressive winners. A power analysis indicated that the sample size was adequate to detect a medium effect (according to G*Power a Cohen's d of 0.5 could be reliably detected using this within-subjects design with a sample size of 54).

2.1.2. Materials and measures

2.1.2.1. Winner stimuli. Participants watched eight short videos from Kalokerinos et al. (2014) Experiment 3. For each domain (Academy Awards [2 videos], tennis matches [4 videos], game shows [2 videos]), participants watched a video featuring *inexpressive* winners—who were rated as suppressing positive emotion—and a video featuring *expressive* winners—who were rated as expressing positive emotion (counterbalanced as to whether expressive or inexpressive winners were viewed first). Winners did not speak in the videos; participants saw only the emotional reaction. The stimulus set is available on the OSF (osf.io/pe5d7).

2.1.2.2. Winner expressivity. As a manipulation check, participants rated the degree to which winners expressed four positive emotions (joy, happiness, pride, and gratitude), scored on a scale ranging from 1, not at all to 7, very much.

2.1.2.3. Winner ratings. Winners were rated on reputational characteristics on a scale from 1, very low to 7, very high. The items measured in all experiments (plus authenticity, which was measured in five of the eight experiments) are included in Appendix A. These included multi-item measures of perceived status (adapted from Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; $\alpha = 0.92$) and perceived competence (adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; $\alpha = 0.89$). Other items were purposed designed based on face validity and consisted of single item measures of dominance, prestige, charisma, and success. We also included a single item measure of perceived future performance (likelihood of winning in future) scored on a scale ranging from 1, not at all to 7, very much.

2.1.3. Results

In Experiments 1 and 2, our analyses followed the same procedure. We performed multivariate mixed effect analyses across all dependent variables, including random intercepts of stimuli and participant. We first compared a null multivariate model (model 1 in the available R code) against a multivariate model that included the fixed main effect of winner expressivity (model 2). This comparison is essentially the multilevel equivalent of a MANOVA, testing whether the main effects were significant overall across the set of dependent measures.

We used the procedure outlined by LaHuis, Hartman, Hakoyama, and Clark (2014) to calculate partial effect sizes for the models, which is approximately equivalent to \mathbb{R}^2 . Results on the individual dependent measures are displayed in Table 1 (winner expressivity results) and Table 2 (winner ratings results). The model specifications for these multivariate analyses are outlined in Table 3 and the model specifications for the analyses on individual dependent variables are outlined in Table 4.

Overall across the full set of dependent measures there was evidence of a significant main effect of winner expressivity, $\chi^2(11)=614.25$, p<.001, $R^2=0.06$. Inspection of the trend on individual dependent measures in Tables 1 and 2 indicates that winner expressivity tended to increase scores on these variables.

It is notable in Table 1 that the effects on the emotion variables show that expressive winners were rated as expressing more happiness,

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Table 1} \\ \textbf{Effects on perceived emotion expressed by winners in Experiments 1 and 2.} \\ \end{tabular}$

	Experiment 1 winner expressivity						Experim	Experiment 2 winner expressivity				
	b	se	t	df	p	ES	b	se	t	df	p	ES
Perceived happiness	1.19	0.10	12.55	99	< .001	0.25	2.57	0.29	12.92	12.07	< .001	0.55
Perceived joy	1.32	0.10	12.62	99	< .001	0.27	2.50	0.28	8.78	12.33	< .001	0.55
Perceived pride	0.88	0.11	8.15	99	< .001	0.09	1.76	0.35	5.06	11.22	< .001	0.31
Perceived gratitude	0.40	0.11	3.73	99	.003	0.02	1.47	0.18	8.15	14.10	< .001	0.30

Note. Winner expressivity manipulation coded as suppressive winners = 0, expressive winners = 1. ES = partial effect sizes follow procedure by LaHuis et al. (2014).

 Table 2

 Effects on individual dependent variables across the experiments.

-	Experiment 1 (No moderator)	Experiment 2 (No moderator)	Experiment 3 (M = audience)	Experiment 3 Replication	Experiment 4 (M = ability)	Experiment 4 Replication	Experiment 5 (M = authenticity)	Experiment 5 Replication
Status			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•	***	•	•	
Winner expressivity	t(99) = 1.35 se = .07, b = .09 p = .181, ES < .01	t(1.51) = 2.42 se = .30, b = .73 p = .035, ES = .13	t(1.30) = 2.56 se = .22, b = .56 p = .028, ES = .08	t(1.00) = 1.54 se = .28, b = .43 p = .154, ES = .04	t(1.22) = 2.20 se = .23, b = .50 p = .052, ES = .06	t(1.36) = 1.95 $se = .28,$ $b = .54$ $p = .080,$ $ES = .06$	t(1.83) = 3.21 $se = .17,$ $b = .56$ $p = .008,$ $ES = .08$	t(1.87) = 3.45 se = .18, b = .63 p = .005, ES = .11
Moderator variable			t(1014) = 1.31 $se = .04,$ $b < .01$ $p = .190,$ $ES < .01$	t(200) = .20 se = .13, b = .03 p = .841, ES < .01	t(198.29) = 7.95 $se = .05,$ $b = .43$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .05$	t(202) = 4.03 $se = .12,$ $b = .48$ $p < .001,$ $ES < .01$	t(211.80) = -4.47 $se = .04,$ $b =17$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$	t(196.99) = 4.34 $se = .04,$ $b = .19$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$
Expressivity × moderator			t(236.57) = .96 se = .08, b = .07 p = .336, ES = .08	t(200) = .60 se = .11, b = .06 p = .601, ES = .04	t(1231) = 1.07 $se = .07,$ $b = .08$ $p = .285,$ $ES = .11$	t(202) =71 $se = .11,$ $b =08$ $p = .479,$ $ES = .06$	t(21.58) = 7.91 $se = .08,$ $b = .61$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .12$	t(196.50) = 7.12 $se = .08,$ $b = .58$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .14$
Competence								
Winner Expressivity	t(99) = 2.51 se = .06, b = .15 p = .14, ES = .01	t(1.86) = 2.89 se = .26, b = .74 p = .15, ES = .15	t(1.70) = 3.52 se = .17, b = .61 p = .005, ES = .10	t(1.68) = 2.23 se = .21, b = .47 p = .049, ES = .06	t(1.23) = 2.74 se = .18, b = .48 p = .020, ES = .05	t(1.53) = 2.70 $se = .21,$ $b = .56$ $p = .021,$ $ES = .08$	t(11.16) = 3.94 se = .14, b = .55 p = .002, ES = .09	t(1.98) = 4.41 se = .13, b = .55 p = .001, ES = .10
Moderator variable			t(1673) = .19 se = .01, b < .01 p = .846, ES < .01	t(199.71) =74 $se = .13,$ $b =09$ $p = .460,$ $ES < .01$	t(198.80) = 1.74 se = .07, b = .75 p < .001, ES = .13	t(202) = 6.64 $se = .11,$ $b = .72$ $p < .001,$ $ES < .01$	t(211.73) = 6.25 $se = .04,$ $b = .23$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .02$	t(195.10) = 5.37 $se = .04,$ $b = .22$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .02$
Expressivity × moderator			t(322) = .57 se = .07, b = .04 p = .569, ES = .10	t(200) = .55 se = .10, b = .06 p = .581, ES = .06	t(1213) = .32 se = .01, b = .02 p = .747, ES = .18	t(202) =83 $se = .10,$ $b =08$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .08$	t(211.89) = 8.50 se = .08, b = .70 p < .001, ES = .14	t(197.50) = 7.93 se = .09, b = .68 p < .001, ES = .15
Dominance								
Winner expressivity	t(99.16) = 5.96 $se = .09,$ $b = .54$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .04$	t(1.43) = 1.51 se = .37, b = .55 p = .161, ES = .05	t(12.98) = 2.19 se = .25, b = .54 p = 053, ES = .05	t(1.26) = 1.04 se = .34, b = .35 p = .321, ES = .02	t(1.21) = 1.26 se = .29, b = .36 p = .237, ES = .02	t(1.19) = 1.37 se = .34, b = .47 p = .202, ES = .03	t(1.91) = 2.13 se = .18, b = .40 p = .057, ES = .03	t(1.60) = 1.70 se = .23, b = .39 p = .118, ES = .03
Moderator variable			t(197.05) = 2.43 se = .05, b = .13 p = .016, ES < .01	t(195.78) = 1.79 se = .15, b = .27 p = .076, ES < .01	t(197.92) = 6.18 $se = .06,$ $b = .37$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .02$	t(202) = 2.96 $se = .13,$ $b = .39$ $p = .003,$ $ES < .01$	t(207.67) = -1.28 $se = .05,$ $b =06$ $p = .202,$ $ES < .01$	t(196.77) = 3.00 $se = .05,$ $b = .14$ $p = .003,$ $ES < .01$
Expressivity × moderator			t(1089.10) = 2.77 $se = .10,$ $b = .27$ $p = .005,$ $ES = .05$	t(200) = 2.75 se = .12, b = .33 p = .007, ES = .02	t(1068) = .55 $se = .09,$ $b = .05$ $p = .584,$ $ES = .04$	t(202) = .62 se = .12, b = .07 p = .540, ES = .03	t(2287) = 2.94 se = .09, b = .27 p = .003, ES = .03	t(1988) = 2.61 $se = .01,$ $b = .23$ $p = .009,$ $ES = .03$
Prestige Winner expressivity	t(99) =16 $se = .09,$ $b =01$ $p = .877,$ $ES < .01$	t(1.72) = 2.79 se = .27, b = .77 p = .018, ES = .11	t(1.20) = 2.51 se = .05, b = .49 p = .031, ES = .05	t(1.36) = 1.48 se = .25, b = .37 p = .169, ES = .03	t(1.09) = 2.00 se = .20, b = .41 p = .073, ES = .03	t(1.45) = 2.14 $se = .26,$ $b = .56$ $p = .057,$ $ES = .06$	t(1.73) = 3.01 $se = .16,$ $b = .50$ $p = .012,$ $ES = .05$	t(1.98) = 3.05 se = .16, b = .48 p = .011, ES = .06
Moderator variable			t(1885) =08 se = .05, b < .01 p = 939, ES < .01	t(199.02) =04 $se = .15,$ $b =05$ $p = .736,$ $ES < .01$	t(198.34) = 7.49 $se = .06,$ $b = .46$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .04$	t(202) = 3.96 $se = .13,$ $b = .53$ $p < .001,$ $ES < .01$	t(298.12) = 4.43 $se = .05,$ $b = .20$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$	t(196.51) = 4.66 $se = .05,$ $b = .23$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$
Expressivity × moderator			t(2187.20) =65 $se = .09,$ $b =06$ $p = .519,$ $ES = .05$	t(299) = .79 se = .11, b = .08 p = 487, ES = .03	t(1178) = .29 se = .08, b = .02 p = .775, ES = .07	t(202) =78 $se = .12,$ $b =09$ $p = .439,$ $ES = .06$	t(496.30) = 7.98 $se = .08,$ $b = .67$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .08$	t(197.11) = 7.42 $se = .09,$ $b = .65$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .09$

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Table 2 (continued)

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Charisma								
Winner expressivity	t(99) = 5.50 se = .11, b = .63 p < .001, ES = .06	t(1.62) = 3.73 $se = .38,$ $b = 1.42$ $p = .004,$ $ES = .24$	t(1.70) = 4.26 se = .33, b = 1.39 p = .001, ES = .22	t(1.56) = 3.37 se = .35, b = 1.20 p = .007, ES = .17	t(1.57) = 4.16 se = .33, b = 1.35 p = .002, ES = .21	t(1.34) = 3.58 $se = .36,$ $b = 1.29$ $p = .004,$ $ES = .19$	t(1.92) = 5.21 $se = .28,$ $b = 1.46$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .24$	t(1.91) = 5.60 $se = .05,$ $b = 1.59$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .29$
Moderator variable			t(1723.80) =43 $se = .05,$ $b =02$ $p = .665,$ $ES < .01$	t(189.97) = .88 se = .11, b = .10 p = .380, ES < .01	t(197.33) = 3.85 $se = .06,$ $b = .22$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$	t(202) = 3.06 se = .11, b = .34 p = .002, ES < .01	t(21.50) = 4.14 $se = .05,$ $b = .22$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$	t(197.49) = 6.55 $se = .05,$ $b = .34$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$
Expressivity × moderator			t(2187.10) = -1.36 $se = .10,$ $b =14$ $p = .172,$ $ES = .22$	t(200) = .04 se = .15, b = .54 p = .971, ES = .17	t(788.30) = 2.52 se = .10, b = .24 p = .012, ES = .22	t(202) = 1.63 $se = .14,$ $b = .22$ $p = .104,$ $ES = .19$	t(2287.80) = 7.89 $se = .10,$ $b = .79$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .27$	t(2187) = 7.08 $se = .10,$ $b = .69$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .32$
Success								
Winner expressivity	t(99) = 2.14 $se = .07,$ $b = .15$ $p = .034,$ $ES < .01$	t(11.39) = 3.09 se = .22, b = .68 p = .009, ES = .11	t(1.41) = 3.15 $se = .16,$ $b = .50$ $p = .010,$ $ES = .05$	t(1.83) = 2.16 $se = .21,$ $b = .44$ $p = .054,$ $ES = .04$	t(1.29) = 2.37 se = .16, b = .38 p = .039, ES = .02	t(1.70) = 2.70 $se = .19,$ $b = .52$ $p = .021,$ $ES = .05$	t(11.15) = 3.59 $se = .15,$ $b = .52$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .06$	t(1.92) = 3.57 se = .14, b = .51 p = .004, ES = .06
Moderator variable			t(198.19) = .51 se = .05, b = .02 p = .612, ES < .01	t(199.98) = -1.28 $se = .14,$ $b =18$ $p = .202,$ $ES < .01$	t(198.80) = 9.24 $se = .09,$ $b = .81$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .11$	t(202) = 6.50 $se = .13,$ $b = .81$ $p < .001,$ $ES < .01$	t(212.42) = 5.06 se = .05, b = .24 p < .001, ES = .01	t(196.88) = 4.25 $se = .05,$ $b = .20$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$
Expressivity × moderator			t(197.51) = .84 se = .09, b = .08 p = .404, ES = .05	t(200) =71 se = .11, b =08 p = .481, ES = .04	t(1548.40) =84 $se = .08,$ $b =07$ $p = .339,$ $ES = .13$	t(202) =27 $se = .11,$ $b =03$ $p = .787,$ $ES = .05$	t(212.85) = 9.38 $se = .10,$ $b = .91$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .15$	t(198.30) = 8.32 $se = .10,$ $b = .81$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .11$
Authenticity Winner expressivity			t(11.95) = 2.31 $se = .22,$ $b = .52$ $p = .040,$ $ES = .04$		t(11.16) = 1.68 $se = .21,$ $b = .35$ $p = .121,$ $ES = 02$	t(12.45) = 1.94 se = .12, b = .22 p = .076, ES = .01	t(13.12) = 3.04 $se = .15,$ $b = .44$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .02$	t(14.23) = 3.27 se = .13, b = .43 p = .006, ES = .02
Moderator variable			t(197.40) =78 $se = .05,$ $b =04$ $p = .437,$ $ES < .01$		t(197.42) = 2.80 $se = .06,$ $b = .17$ $p = .005,$ $ES = .01$	t(202) = 1.06 $se = .11,$ $b = .12$ $p = .291,$ $ES < .01$	t(214.02) = 13.49 $se = .10,$ $b = 1.34$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .19$	t(198.68) = 14.21 $se = .10,$ $b = 1.45$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .23$
Expressivity × moderator			t(924.70) = .57 se = .10, b = .06 p = .568, ES = .04		t(197.96) = .48 se = .11, b = .05 p = .634, ES = .02	t(202) = .12 se = .11, b = .01 p = .905, ES = .01	t(213.85) = 4.16 $se = .12,$ $b = .49$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .22$	t(198.16) = 6.32 $se = .11,$ $b = .71$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .26$
Perform Winner expressivity	t(99) = 2.33 se = .09, b = .22 p = .022, ES = .01	t(11.85) = 2.2, se = .19, b = .43 p = .045, ES = .05	t(1.71) = 1.81 se = .27, b = .27 p = .098, ES = .02	t(11.23) = .36 se = .14, b = .05 p = .726, ES < .01	t(1.00) = 1.90 se = .14, b = .26 p = .086, ES = 01	t(11.58) = 1.94 se = .14, b = .27 p = .078, ES = .02	t(1.82) = 3.42 se = .04, b = .33 p = .006, ES = .02	t(1.37) = 2.60 se = .11, b = .28 p = .026, ES = .02
Moderator variable			t(1987) =57 se = .04, b =02 p = .566, ES < .01	t(197.74) = -1.24 $se = .15,$ $b =18$ $p = 216,$ $ES < .01$	t(2188) = 24.38 $se = .01,$ $b = 1.24$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .21$	t(202.02) = 6.49 $se = .13,$ $b = .86$ $p < .001,$ $ES < .01$	t(281.63) = 5.56 $se = .06,$ $b = .24$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .01$	t(194.72) = 6.21 $se = .04,$ $b = .27$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .02$
Expressivity × moderator			t(422.60) = .26 $se = .09,$ $b = .02$ $p = .793,$ $ES = .02$	t(200) =54 $se = .10,$ $b =06$ $p = .593,$ $ES < .01$	t(1778) = .76 se = .08, b = .06 p = .448, ES = .21	t(202.04) = .13 se = .11, b = .01 p = .898, ES = .02	t(207.86) = 8.19 $se = .10,$ $b = .84$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .08$	t(198.13) = 8.95 $se = .11,$ $b = 1.00$ $p < .001,$ $ES = .10$

Note. M = Moderator. ES = partial effect sizes follow procedure by LaHuis et al. (2014). Shaded cells indicate significant effects.

joy, pride, and gratitude, than inexpressive winners. Indeed, winners were rated as expressing joy and happiness most, followed by pride and gratitude.

3. Experiment 2: experimentally controlled winner stimuli

Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the effects in Experiment 1 using a new stimulus set. These stimuli were created in the lab and are thus less likely to feature the extreme positive emotion displays shown in the more naturalistic videos of Experiment 1. In addition to representing a more conservative test, the new stimuli are also more controlled than

the videos used in Experiment 1: participants were specifically asked to express or suppress felt positive emotion. We again hypothesized that expressive winners would be rated as higher in social standing than inexpressive winners.

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants and design

One hundred and fifty-one community members from MTurk completed the study (44% women, $M_{\rm age}=38.44$, $SD_{\rm age}=13.17$, age range 19–73). Although Experiment 1 suggested that a smaller sample size

Table 3Description of mixed model specifications for multivariate analyses conducted across the experiments.

	Package	Model	Fixed effects	Random effects
Experiment 1	lmerTest	1	Null model	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant
		2	Winner expressivity	
Experiment 2	lmerTest	1	Null model	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant
		2	Winner expressivity	
Experiment 3	lmerTest	1	Null model	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant
		2	Winner expressivity	
		3	Winner audience	
		4	Winner expressivity and winner audience	
		5	Winner expressivity × winner audience interaction	
Experiment 4	lmerTest	1	Null model	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant
		2	Winner expressivity	
		3	Winner ability	
		4	Winner expressivity and winner ability	
		5	Winner expressivity × winner ability interaction	
Experiment 5	lmerTest	1	Null model	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant
		2	Winner expressivity	
		3	Winner authenticity	
		4	Winner expressivity and winner authenticity	
		5	Winner expressivity \times winner authenticity interaction	

Note. R code for the analyses in each experiment is available on the OSF (osf.io/pe5d7); p values in the lmerTest package are calculated using a Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of freedom.

Table 4Description of mixed model specifications for analyses conducted on individual dependent variables.

	Package	Fixed effects	Random effects
Experiment 1	lmerTest	Winner expressivity	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant
Experiment 2	lmerTest	Winner expressivity	Random slope of expressivity with respect to participant Random intercepts of stimuli and participant Random slope of expressivity with respect to participant
Experiment 3			
Main effects	lmerTest	Winner expressivity and winner audience	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant Random slopes of expressivity and audience by participant
Interaction	lmerTest	Winner expressivity \times winner audience	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant Random slope of the interaction by participant
Experiment 4			
Main effects	lmerTest	Winner expressivity and winner ability	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant Random slopes of expressivity and ability by participant
Interaction	lmerTest	Winner expressivity \times winner ability	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant Random slope of the interaction by participant
Experiment 5			ramaom stope of the interaction by participant
Main effects	lmerTest	Winner expressivity and winner authenticity	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant Random slopes of expressivity and authenticity by participa
Interaction	lmerTest	Winner expressivity \times winner authenticity	Random intercepts of stimuli and participant Random slope of the interaction by participant

R code for the analyses in each experiment is available on the OSF (osf.io/pe5d7); p values in the lmerTest package are calculated using a Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of freedom.

would be adequate, we increased the sample size to account for the fact that we introduced new experimental stimuli that may have a weaker signal. The experiment employed a within-subjects design in which participants viewed videos of winners who expressed or suppressed positive emotion.

3.1.2. Materials and measures

3.1.2.1. Winner stimuli. We purpose-developed the winner stimuli in the lab. Thirty-seven participants (55% women, $M_{\rm age}=20.47$, $SD_{\rm age}=4.74$, age range 17–42) completed a short problem-solving task and all were informed that they received a score of 'excellent', combined with positive feedback from the experimenter. Participants then recorded a short video ostensibly to be shown to people who performed poorly on the same task. This was designed to create a context in which participants felt like winners.

Participants answered a series of questions in the video, among them the target question "What was your score on the task?" We isolated participants' answer to this question to serve as stimuli. Half of the participants were given an instruction to express positive emotion while recording the video. The other half were given an instruction to suppress the expression of positive emotion while recording the video.

To source a manageable stimulus set, we showed the videos to 55 independent raters on MTurk and selected six videos that scored high on perceived suppression in the suppressive condition (M=4.78) and six videos that scored low on perceived suppression (M=2.69) in the expressive condition on a 5-point scale. These perceived differences were replicated by two coders blind to condition who rated the 12 selected expressive and suppressive videos in terms of how much positive emotion the targets were expressing on a 7-point scale. Expressive targets were perceived as expressing more positive emotion (M=5.17) than suppressive targets (M=1.75).

The final videos were equivalent across conditions in terms of video length (averaging 4–5 s) and gender and ethnicity of the targets (videos in both conditions included three White females, two White males, and one Asian female, reflecting the gender and race balance of the overall stimulus set). Researchers may request access to the stimulus set from

the authors.

Participants in Experiment 2 watched the 12 videos (counterbalanced in blocks, so that participants viewed all expressive or all suppressive winners first). Participants were told that they would view videos of targets who received an excellent score on a problem-solving task and recorded a video to describe their performance.

3.1.2.2. Winner ratings. Winner ratings were identical to Experiment 1 (see Appendix A): perceived winner expressivity; status ($\alpha = 0.92$); competence ($\alpha = 0.90$), dominance; prestige; charisma; success; and perceived future performance.

3.1.3. Results

Our analytic strategy was identical to Experiment 1. Overall across the full set of dependent measures there was evidence of a significant main effect of winner expressivity, $\chi^2(11)=1858.60,\ p<.001,$ $R^2=0.25.$ Inspection of the trend on individual dependent measures in Tables 1 and 2 indicates that winner expressivity tended to increase scores on these variables.

It is notable again that the effects on the emotion variables show that expressive winners were rated as expressing more happiness, joy, pride, and gratitude, than inexpressive winners (see Table 1). Indeed, winners were rated as expressing joy and happiness most, followed by pride and gratitude.

4. Experiment 3: does audience matter?

In two experiments, we found winners who expressed positive emotion were rated as higher in social standing, broadly construed, compared to winners who suppressed positive emotion. In the following three experiments, we test three mechanisms that might explain this pattern of results. In Experiment 3, we tested whether perceptions of inconsiderateness might underpin the association between positive emotion expression and high social standing. To test this link, we explored the audience of the emotional expression as a potential moderating factor. We told participants that the winners expressed positive emotion to a person who had done badly on the same task (a loser) or a person who had not completed the task. We reasoned that observers might assume expressive winners are showing lack of concern for others, in which case expressive winners would only be rated higher in social standing when interacting with a but not a control partner who had no involvement in the task.

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants and design

Two hundred community members from MTurk completed the study (46% women, $M_{\rm age} = 34.80$, $SD_{\rm age} = 10.27$, age range 19–69). We increased the sample size in this study to account for the fact that we introduced an additional manipulation. The experiment employed a 2 (winner expressivity: expressive vs. suppressive) \times 2 (winner audience: control vs. loser) within-subjects design. 1

4.1.2. Materials and measures

4.1.2.1. Winner expressivity manipulation. Winner expressivity was manipulated within-subjects using the same stimuli as Experiment 2.

4.1.2.2. Winner audience manipulation. To manipulate winner audience, participants were informed the targets in the videos were describing their performance on a problem-solving task to another

person. Winners in the *loser condition* were said to be describing their score to a person who did poorly on the task. Winners in the *control condition* were said to be describing their score to a person who did not complete the task.

Winner audience was manipulated within-subjects, and randomized across participants. Thus, participants each saw a different combination of specific video target and audience condition, although this presentation was always balanced so that each participant saw three suppressive, loser condition [control condition] winners and three expressive, loser condition [control condition] winners.

4.1.2.3. Winner ratings. Winner ratings were identical to Experiment 2 (see Appendix A): perceived status ($\alpha = 0.90$); competence ($\alpha = 0.90$); dominance; prestige; charisma; success; and future performance. In addition, three items assessed perceived authenticity, scored on a scale ranging from 1, not at all to 7, very much ($\alpha = 0.83$).

4.1.2.4. Attention checks. We embedded two attention checks to ensure data quality (see Appendix A)—one each in the block of expressive targets and suppressive targets. Eighteen participants failed both attention checks. However, excluding these participants did not alter the results and we therefore retained them in the final sample.

4.2. Results

4.2.1. Analytic strategy

In Experiments 3–5, our analyses followed the same procedure. We performed multivariate mixed effect analyses across all dependent variables, including random intercepts of stimuli and participant. We first compared a null multivariate model (model 1 in the available R code) against a multivariate model that included the fixed main effect of winner expressivity (model 2), and another multivariate model that included the fixed main effect of the moderator variable for a given experiment (model 3). These comparisons are essentially the multilevel equivalent of a MANOVA, testing whether the main effects were significant overall across the set of dependent measures.

To assess the effect of the interaction, we compared a multivariate mixed model that included fixed main effects for winner expressivity and the moderator variable (model 4), against a multivariate model that included the interaction between these variables (model 5). This comparison tests whether the interaction was significant overall across the set of dependent measures. As in Experiments 1 and 2, we used the procedure outlined by LaHuis et al. (2014) to calculate partial effect sizes for the models, which is approximately equivalent to \mathbb{R}^2 . Results on the individual dependent measures are displayed in Table 2. The model specifications for the multivariate analyses are outlined in Table 3 and the model specifications for the analyses on individual dependent variables are outlined in Table 4.

4.2.2. Winner ratings

4.2.2.1. Winner expressivity main effects. Overall across the set of dependent measures there was evidence of a significant main effect of winner expressivity, $\chi^2(8) = 316.19$, p < .001, $R^2 = 0.07$ Inspection of the trend on individual dependent measures in Table 2 indicates that winner expressivity tended to increase scores on these variables.

4.2.2.2. Audience manipulation main effects. Overall across the set of dependent measures there was no evidence of a main effect of winner audience, $\chi^2(8) = 8.11$, p = .422, $R^2 < 0.00$.

4.2.2.3. Expressivity \times audience interactions. Overall across the set of dependent measures there was no evidence of an interaction between winner expressivity and audience, $\chi^2(8) = 12.11$, p = .146, $R^2 = 0.07$. As can be seen in Table 2, the only individual dependent measure on which there was a significant interaction was dominance, such that expressive winners were perceived as more dominant when interacting

 $^{^{1}}$ We conducted a substantively identical study (N=202; 54% female; $M_{\rm age}=38.01, SD=12.15$, age range 18–77) that differed from Experiment 3 only in that winner audience was manipulated between-subjects. This revealed similar results to those reported below. Results of this experiment are displayed in Table 2.

with a loser, b = 0.69, se = 0.25, t(10.90) = 2.69, p = .021, but not a control partner, b = 0.41, se = 0.26, t(11) = 1.61, p = .136. This interaction on dominance also appeared in the Experiment 3 replication. There were no significant interactions on any other dependent measure.

4.3. Summary

Although there is some inconsistency on individual variables across experiments, a relatively consistent pattern emerges that expressive winners tend to be rated as higher in social standing than inexpressive winners. In this study, we also found that expressive winners appeared more authentic than inexpressive winners. However, except for an isolated effect on perceived dominance, we did not find that *who* the winner was speaking to made a difference to how the winners were perceived; nor was there any evidence of such moderation in the replication experiment (see Table 2). Regardless of audience, expressive winners were attributed higher social standing than inexpressive winners by third-party observers who took no part in the competition.

5. Experiment 4: does ability matter?

Experiment 4 manipulated the perceived ability of the winners to be low or high. We have found consistently that expressive winners are rated as more competent than inexpressive winners. This suggests that perceived competence might be a process through which expressivity influences evaluations. We reasoned if perceivers believe the win to be a "fluke" (i.e., good performance by an incompetent person) then expressing positive emotion might not make them appear high in social standing. If this reasoning is correct, we would expect to see an effect of winner expressivity when the winner is described as competent, but not when they are described as incompetent.

5.1. Method

5.1.1. Participants and design

Two hundred community members from MTurk completed the study (44% women, $M_{\rm age}=36.16$, $SD_{\rm age}=11.36$, age range 19–74). The experiment employed a 2 (winner expressivity: expressive vs. suppressive) × 2 (winner competence: high vs. low) within-subjects design.²

5.1.2. Materials and measures

5.1.2.1. Winner expressivity manipulation. Winner expressivity was manipulated within-subjects using the same stimuli as Experiments 2–3.

5.1.2.2. Winner ability manipulation. To manipulate winner ability, participants were informed that the targets in the videos had completed a series of problem-solving tasks and were describing their performance on one of these tasks. High competence winners were described as performing above average on all problem-solving tasks, while low competence winners were described as performing below average on all problem-solving tasks except the one mentioned in the videos.

Winner competence was manipulated within-subjects, and randomized across participants. This meant participants saw a different combination of specific video target and competence condition, although presentation was balanced so that each participant saw three suppressive, high competence [low competence] winners and three expressive, high competence [low competence] winners.

5.1.2.3. Winner ratings. Winner ratings were identical to Experiment 2 (see Appendix A), including perceived status ($\alpha=0.92$); competence (a manipulation check; $\alpha=0.89$); authenticity ($\alpha=0.86$); and the single item measures. The same two attention check items used in Experiment 3 were included. Nineteen participants failed both attention checks. However, excluding these participants did not alter the results and we therefore retained them in the final sample.

5.2. Results

Analytic strategy was identical to Experiment 3. Results on the individual dependent measures are displayed in Table 2. The model specifications for the multivariate analyses are outlined in Table 3 and the model specifications for the analyses on individual dependent variables are outlined in Table 4.

5.2.1. Winner ratings

5.2.1.1. Winner expressivity main effects. Overall across the set of dependent measures there was evidence of a significant main effect of winner expressivity, $\chi^2(8) = 321.70$, p < .001, $R^2 = 0.05$. Inspection of the trend on individual dependent measures in Table 2 indicates that winner expressivity tended to increase scores on these variables.

5.2.1.2. Ability manipulation main effects. Overall across the set of dependent measures there was evidence of a significant main effect of winner ability, $\chi^2(8) = 1290.80$, p < .001, $R^2 = 0.06$. Inspection of the trend on individual dependent measures in Table 2 indicates that winner ability tended to increase scores on these variables.

5.2.1.3. Expressivity \times ability interactions. Overall across the set of dependent measures there was no evidence of an interaction between winner expressivity and ability, $\chi^2(8) = 7.83$, p = .450, $R^2 = 0.11$. As can be seen in Table 2, the only individual dependent measure on which there was a significant interaction was charisma, such that expressive winners were perceived as charismatic when they were incompetent, b = 1.23, se = 0.33, t(11.00) = 3.74, p = .003, but even more so when they were competent, b = 1.48, se = 0.33, t(11.10) = 4.47, p < .001. This interaction on charisma did not appear in the Experiment 4 replication. There were no significant interactions on any other dependent measure.

5.3. Summary

As in previous experiments, we found expressive winners tended to be rated as higher in social standing than inexpressive winners. We also found main effects of winner competence, such that competent winners were evaluated as higher in social standing than incompetent winners. However, we found no consistent interaction effects, indicating that winner competence did not moderate the expressivity effect in the main experiment or the replication experiment (see Table 2).

6. Experiment 5: does authenticity matter?

We tested a final mechanism in Experiment 5, manipulating the perceived authenticity of winners to be low or high. We have found relatively consistently that expressive winners are perceived as more authentic than inexpressive winners (see Table 2). Research suggests that people like and respect people who are authentic compared to those who are inauthentic (Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Liu & Perrewe, 2006). Moreover, an authentic winner has relatively clear motives for behaving in the way they do—celebrating a valuable and meaningful win—whereas the motives of an inauthentic winner who does not express their true felt emotion are relatively opaque. This means that an authentic winner is likely to be esteemed and trusted more than an inauthentic winner, suggesting a respect-based pathway to higher social standing. If this reasoning is correct, we would expect to see an

 $^{^2}$ We conducted a substantively identical study (N = 203; 58% female; $M_{\rm age}=38.33$, SD=12.06, age range 19–80) that differed from Experiment 4 only in that winner competence was manipulated between-subjects. This study revealed substantively similar results to those reported below. Results of this experiment are displayed in Table 2.

Table 5

Meta-analysis of random effects of winner expressivity across the experiments.

	Heterogeneity Q	Effect size	Effect magnitude	z	p	95% confidence intervals
Perceived status	22.03 (p = .003)	0.41	Medium	8.18	< .001	0.311 to 0.507
Perceived competence	18.52 (p = .010)	0.45	Medium	9.98	< .001	0.359 to 0.535
Perceived dominance	4.06 (p = .773)	0.29	Small	10.86	< .001	0.235 to 0.339
Perceived prestige	22.15 (p = .002)	0.32	Medium	6.40	< .001	0.224 to 0.423
Perceived charisma	204.68 (p < .001)	1.16	Large	7.59	< .001	0.860 to 1.458
Perceived success	11.85 (p < .001)	0.35	Medium	10.64	< .001	0.285 to 0.414
Perceived authenticity	3.50 (p = .478)	0.26	Small	8.18	< .001	0.198 to 0.323
Perceived future performance	9.06 (p = .249)	0.19	Small	6.19	< .001	0.128 to 0.246

Note. Average effect size across experiments based on standardized regression coefficients from mixed effects models. We report the effects using a random model.

association between expressivity and social standing when winners are authentic in their emotion expression compared to inauthentic.

6.1. Method

6.1.1. Participants and design

Two hundred community members from MTurk completed the experiment (49% women, $M_{\rm age}=34.95$, $SD_{\rm age}=12.18$, age range 18–75), which employed a 2 (winner expressivity: expressive vs. suppressive) \times 2 (winner authenticity: authentic vs. inauthentic) within-subjects design.³

6.1.2. Materials and measures

6.1.2.1. Winner expressivity manipulation. Winner expressivity was manipulated within-subjects using the same stimuli as Experiments 2–4.

6.1.2.2. Winner authenticity manipulation. To manipulate winner authenticity, participants were informed that targets in the videos had provided ratings of their felt emotional experience via a feeling thermometer (based on a manipulation used in Kalokerinos, Greenaway, & Casey, 2017). Participants were shown an example of two feeling thermometers at the beginning of the experiment representing a person who was experiencing a high degree of positive emotion (depicted with a thermometer close to full) and a person who was experiencing a low degree of positive emotion (depicted with a thermometer below the half-way point). We had three different versions of each of these thermometers (six thermometers in total) that showed slightly different "fill levels" in order to avoid suspicion among participants that too many targets reported the same amount of felt emotion.

Apparently authentic winners were expressive targets who were depicted as feeling a high degree of positive emotion, and suppressive targets who were depicted as feeling a low degree of positive emotion. This manipulation was reinforced with text that read "This person is showing how they truly feel". In contrast, apparently inauthentic winners were expressive targets who were depicted as feeling a low degree of positive emotion, and suppressive targets who were depicted as feeling a high degree of positive emotion. This manipulation was reinforced with text that read "This person is not showing how they truly feel".

Winner authenticity was manipulated within-subjects, and randomized across participants. This meant participants saw a different combination of specific video target and authenticity condition, although presentation was balanced so that each participant saw three suppressive, authentic [inauthentic] winners and three expressive, authentic [inauthentic] winners.

6.1.2.3. Winner ratings. Winner ratings were identical to the previous

experiments (see Appendix A): perceived status ($\alpha=0.88$); competence ($\alpha=0.87$); authenticity (a manipulation check; $\alpha=0.88$); and the single item measures. The same two attention check items used in the previous experiments were included. Twenty-two participants failed both attention checks. However, excluding these participants did not alter the results and we therefore retained them in the final sample.

6.2. Results

Analytic strategy was identical to Experiments 3 and 4. Results on the individual dependent variables are displayed in Table 2. The model specifications for the multivariate analyses are outlined in Table 3 and the model specifications for the analyses on individual dependent variables are outlined in Table 4.

6.2.1. Winner ratings

6.2.1.1. Winner expressivity main effects. Overall across the set of dependent measures there was evidence of a significant main effect of winner expressivity, $\chi^2(8) = 372.91$, p < .001, $R^2 = 0.07$. Inspection of the trend on individual dependent measures in Table 2 indicates that winner expressivity tended to increase scores on these variables.

6.2.1.2. Authenticity manipulation main effects. Overall across the set of dependent measures there evidence of a significant main effect of winner authenticity, $\chi^2(8)=867.21,\,p<.001,\,R^2=0.04$. Inspection of the trend on individual dependent measures in Table 2 indicates that winner authenticity tended to increase scores on these variables.

6.2.1.3. Expressivity × authenticity interactions. Overall across the set of dependent measures there was evidence of a significant interaction between winner expressivity and authenticity, $\chi^2(8) = 409.48$, p < .001, $R^2 = 0.12$. As can be seen in Table 2, the interaction was a significant on all individual dependent measures. Simple effects followed the same pattern on all variables. There were no significant simple effects of winner expressivity in the inauthentic condition, bs < 0.25, ps > 0.179 (except charisma, b = 1.06, se = 28, t = (10.60) = 3.78, p = .003). However, there were significant simple effects in the authentic condition on all variables, bs > 0.52, ps < 0.016 ($b_{charisma} = 1.84$, se = 28, t(10.60) = 6.56, p < .001). These interactions also appeared in the Experiment 5 replication.

6.3. Summary

Apparently authentic expressive winners were rated as higher in social standing than suppressive winners, but the same was not true of inauthentically expressive winners. These effects were consistent across the main experiment and the replication experiment (see Table 2). As hypothesized, the social benefits of positive emotion expression occurred when the expresser was perceived to be behaving genuinely, signalling that the target is expressing their true emotions.

 $^{^3}$ We conducted a pure replication of this study (N = 200; 46% female; $M_{\rm age}=33.21,$ SD = 10.81, age range 18–68), which revealed very similar results to those reported below. Standardized regression coefficients for the replication results are displayed in Table 2.

6.4. Meta-analysis

Although a consistent pattern emerged across the experiments, not all effects were significant in individual experiments. We therefore conducted a meta-analysis using the R *metafor* package (Viechtbauer, 2010) with a random effects model to assess the overall robustness of the effects. This also allows us to determine the effect size of winner expressivity on the different dimensions of social standing. We factored in data from all experiments, including replications (N = 1456), using the standardized regression coefficient for each experiment to calculate the average effect size (Peterson & Brown, 2005). A summary of results across the experiments is presented in Table 5.

As seen in Table 5, the overall effect of winner expressivity was significant on all dependent variables such that expressive winners were rated as higher in social standing, broadly construed, than inexpressive winners. We observed small effects on perceived dominance, authenticity, and future performance; medium effects on perceived status, competence, prestige, and success; and a large effect on perceived charisma. This indicates that, overall, the effect of winner expressivity on perceptions of social standing was robust, but that there does appear to be differences in magnitude across the distinct "flavors" of social standing.

7. General discussion

This research investigated perceptions of winners who express, compared to suppress, positive emotion following victory. Across five experiments (and three replication experiments), we found that expressive winners were perceived as higher in social standing than suppressive winners. At their most basic level, these findings suggest that the occasional relational costs to expressing positive emotion following victory may be offset by status benefits.

We assessed social standing broadly across the experiments, including constructs that tapped respect and admiration (i.e., perceived prestige, perceived authenticity; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Liu & Perrewe, 2006), voluntary deference (i.e., perceived influence; Berger et al., 1972), and instrumental value (i.e., perceived competence, success, and future performance; Anderson et al., 2015). To these measures, we added dominance—an alternative pathway to status often compared with prestige (Cheng et al., 2013)—and charisma—a trait associated with both leadership and positive emotion expression (Bono & Ilies, 2006).

The meta-analytic results revealed significant effects of winner expressivity on all dimensions of social standing, suggesting that this perception operates across a broad constellation of impression-forming traits. That said, we did observe differences in the overall magnitude of the effect across the dimensions. In particular, we observed relatively small effects on perceived dominance, suggesting that this effect is unlikely to be driven strongly by perceptions that expressive winners are able to coerce or compel others to obey. In contrast, we observed medium to large effects on perceived prestige, status, competence, success, and charisma—suggesting that the effect of winner expressivity on social standing is more likely to be driven by perceptions that a person is an influential and useful leader to follow (e.g., the perception that people want to rather than have to follow this person).

We also investigated three novel processes underlying these perceptions by manipulating proximal situational constraints. We first investigated whether perceived inconsiderateness might underpin the effect by manipulating the winner's audience (i.e., speaking to a loser or a control participant). We then investigated whether perceived competence might underpin the effect by manipulating the winner's ability. We finally investigated whether respect and trust might underpin the effect by manipulating the winner's authenticity. Only perceived authenticity moderated our effects, such that expressers appeared higher in social standing than suppressers only when their emotion expression was seen as authentic, that is, a reflection of their true emotional

experience.

This moderation by authenticity to us reinforces the notion that the link between winner expressivity and social standing is driven largely by a respectful and voluntary conferral of status to these individuals. Broadly, this suggests expressive winners take a 'prestige' pathway, rather than a 'dominance' pathway to influence (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). As such, it appears that winners are perceived as higher in respect-based social standing when they express compared to suppress positive emotion, but only when that expression is a true signal of their feelings. Thus, it seems important for people to be able to trust the motives of a winner—this person appears genuinely worthy of respect—in order to confer upon them higher social standing.

In interpreting these results, we also consider that positive emotion expressions may act as a signal that the win is important and worth celebrating, while suppression could indicate that the win is less valuable. These signals may be exacerbated by perceptions of authenticity: if the winner is behaving authentically, their expression acts as a direct cue to how much they value the win, and the corresponding reputational value that should be ascribed as a function of the win. If the winner is behaving inauthentically, they may seem to be trying to amplify (expression) or reduce (suppression) the value of the win for reasons that are not entirely clear. Thus, the win no longer acts as a genuine reputational signal. It is clear that there is space for a deeper investigation of the precise reverse appraisals (Hareli & Hess, 2010) that are made when viewing people who are authentic or inauthentic in their emotion expressions, and we view this as an important direction for future research.

The moderation by authenticity is consistent with literature that distinguishes between two types of pride—authentic and hubristic—with the former reflecting genuine feelings of self-worth and the latter reflecting arrogance and self-aggrandizement (Tracy & Robins, 2004). According to Cheng, Tracy, and Henrich (2010), both types of pride are associated with social status, albeit different types of status. Specifically, these authors propose that authentic pride is associated with greater perceived status through a *prestige* pathway, but that hubristic pride is associated with greater perceived status through a *dominance* pathway that inspires fear. We see our findings of moderation by authenticity as fitting squarely with this interpretation.

Another point of correspondence concerns an isolated interaction effect on dominance observed in Experiment 3 and its replication. We found that winners who expressed positive emotion supposedly in the presence of a loser were rated as higher in dominance than winners who suppressed, but that this effect did not occur when the winner was supposedly in the presence of someone who did not engage in the competition. We interpreted this manipulation as likely to make the winner appear inconsiderate (as in Kalokerinos et al., 2014); a perception that is consistent with a hubristic and arrogant form of pride. Given that hubristic pride has been associated with greater perceptions of dominance (Cheng et al., 2010), it is theoretically consistent that our expressive winners were rated as more dominant in this condition. Thus, although we find generally that positive emotion expression may lead to perceptions of status via a prestige pathway, it is important to consider the importance of social context in guiding and shifting these perceptions. Here, for example, we find that a manipulation as simple as who an expression is made to can change the basis of perceptions of social standing from one of respect to intimidation.

We see our findings as replicating and extending on the discrete emotion literature finding that pride expressions are associated with social status (Cheng et al., 2010; Shariff & Tracy, 2009). Yet, in our estimation the present findings do not appear to be reducible to pride alone, as the winners in our stimulus sets were rated as expressing (particularly) joy and happiness, as well as pride and, to a lesser extent, gratitude. Thus, this work suggests that beyond specific emotions, positive emotion expression *in general* can serve as a signal of high social standing to the extent that it conspicuously (and genuinely) advertises one's victorious position. This is important in light of research

demonstrating that, outside the lab, winners express a range of positive emotions as well as pride (Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006).

In addition to an expanded conceptualization of positive emotion, we bring to this literature a novel focus on emotion regulation. Just as prior work has revealed unexpected relational benefits to suppressing positive emotion (Kalokerinos et al., 2014; Schall et al., 2016), we reveal a novel downside to suppressing positive emotion—lower perceived social status in competitive contexts. This expands understanding of this emotion regulation strategy by identifying a new dimension on which suppression might have social costs (i.e., moving beyond affiliation to consider social standing). More broadly, our findings reinforce a recent trend in the emotion regulation literature to consider context as a key factor in determining the success of various emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Bonanno & Burton, 2013).

7.1. Limitations, caveats, and future directions

There are some limitations in the current work that we hope will be addressed with future research. First, the effects of emotion expression on the outcome variables were generally small to medium in size. This may be reflective of the strength of these effects in real situations, but it may also be partially due to our method. In our design, we measured ratings made by third party observers. It may be that these effects are stronger when the rater is a direct target of the emotion expression. Moving forward, it seems important to investigate potential differences between those directly involved in a competition, and those merely observing it.

Relatedly, we conducted these experiments using ratings of video stimuli, rather than using an in vivo interaction task. This method allowed us greater control, but also meant we sacrificed some internal validity. It also meant that we could not measure intrapersonal processes in the winner's thought process (e.g. awareness of the potential social costs of expression), and how these processes influence the impression formed by observers. In addition, the studies were collected using self-report, rather than behavioral methods. In future, introducing paradigms with a greater match to real world scenarios will be important. In particular, these research questions lend themselves to applied field studies in real-life competitive contexts.

On a note about measurement, we generally used only a few items to assess each social standing construct. We did this for two reasons. First, it allowed us to measure a larger number of constructs, showing that reputational benefits to expression across a suite of important variables. Second, it allowed us to keep the task short enough for participants to rate several different targets, allowing us to demonstrate that our effects did not occur because of one individual target. However, in future research it will be important to investigate this topic using more fine-grained and targeted measures. Such an investigation can more clearly outline areas of conceptual differentiation and overlap in different theoretical perspectives on of social standing.

We should note also that our manipulation of authenticity necessarily conflates emotion experience valence (i.e., positive, negative) with perceived authenticity as a function of expression or suppression condition. That is, in our analysis, expressive targets appear to reap

status benefits when they express positive emotion they genuinely feel (express positive/feel positive) more so than suppressive targets whose emotion experience matches their behavior (suppress positive/feel negative). This could be interpreted as a benefit of experiencing positive emotion per se, rather than the unique combination of expression and experience. We note, however, that other comparisons also reveal the unique benefit of expressing genuinely felt positive emotion. Specifically, the express positive/feel positive cell also showed higher ratings on almost all dependent measures in the main experiment and replication experiment compared to the suppress positive/feel positive and express positive/feel negative cells. These additional analyses indicate that neither feeling nor expressing positive emotion, in isolation, are enough to gain a full status benefit; one must do both—expressing an emotion they appear to genuinely feel in order to appear higher in social standing in performance contexts.

8. Conclusions: is it better to express or suppress?

Our findings provide an intriguing counterpoint to the large body of work demonstrating that expressions of happiness and gratitude are typically construed as signals of affiliation, and thus tend to have relationship benefits (e.g., Gable, Reis, Impett, & Asher, 2004; Harker & Keltner, 2001). Here, we find that expressions of these same emotions following victory can enhance reputations, rather than relationships. Indeed, previous work has suggested that expressing positive emotion after a win may be damaging for interpersonal relationships (Kalokerinos et al., 2014). In these cases, suppressing one's emotion is a better relational strategy (Schall et al., 2016). Considered together, this literature highlights the importance of context in determining the ideal emotion regulation strategy.

Our work adds to a literature that suggests expression and suppression are not uniformly 'good' or 'bad' strategies. Instead, winners should choose how they express emotion based on salient social goals. If winners have affiliation goals, suppression may be a better strategy than expression. However, winners have status-based goals, emotion expression may be a better strategy than suppression. To draw on the language of Carnegie's (1936) bestseller, if the goal is to win friends, then suppressing positive emotion is the safest route—even though using this emotion regulation strategy typically incurs social costs in non-competitive contexts. However, if the goal is to influence people, expressing positive emotion following victory makes one appear more competent and successful, solidifying one's position in a social hierarchy. Above all, though, these expressions must appear authentic and genuine: winners only appear to attract reputational benefits when their grin is real.

Open practices

The experiments in this article earned an Open Data badge for transparent practices. Data and code for the experiments and their replications are available on the OSF at osf.io/pe5d7. The stimulus set for Experiment 1 is also available at this location. The measures included across the experiments are located in Appendix A.

Appendix A. Measures

Construct	Number of items	Study	Items
Winner expressivity	4	1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2	To what extent do you think the winner was expressing: Joy To what extent do you think the winner was expressing: Happiness To what extent do you think the winner was expressing: Pride To what extent do you think the winner was expressing: Gratitude

Perceived status	3	1-5 1-5 1-5	How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Status How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Influence How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Prominence
Perceived competence	4	1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5	How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Competence How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Confidence How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Capability
Perceived dominance	1	1-5 1-5	How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Skillfulness How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Dominance
Perceived prestige	1	1-5	How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Prestige
Perceived charisma	1	1-5	How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Frestige
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Perceived success	1	1–5	How high or low would you rate the winner on the following characteristics: Successfulness
Perceived authenticity	3	3–5	The person in the video was acting in an authentic way
ž		3–5	The person in the video is being their "true self"
		3–5	The person in the video is changing the way they act because they are being recorded ^a
Perceived future performance	1	1	How likely to you think this person is to win the next award/match/game they are involved in?
_		2–5	How likely do you think this person is to do well on the next test they perform?
Attention checks	2	3–5	This is a test item. Please answer 1 for this item (embedded in ratings of expressive targets)
		3–5	This is a test item. Please answer 7 for this item (embedded in ratings of suppressive targets)

Note. All items scored on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all/very low) to 7 (very much/very high). Measures of perceived status, competence, dominance, prestige, charisma and success were presented in a random order to participants that varied across videos. Measures of perceived authenticity and future performance were presented in a separate question set but also in a randomized order across targets.

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